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Within the next ten to fifteen years the European Union (EU) could embrace almost 
the entire continent and comprise 25-30 IIM!mber states. In such an enlarged Union, it 
will be crucial to define and agree the essenual foreign and security policy interests 
of the  Union  and  to  reform  the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP). 
Otherwise the European Union will be unable to tackle effectively the growing number 
of  regional and global problems, and its indecision would adversely affect the security 
of its  members.  The  1996  Intergovernmental  Conference  (IGC)  must,  therefore, 
consider  reform  of the  CFSP  not  only  in  light  of a  radically  changed  strategic 
environment but also  in the perspective of a sumtantially enlmged EU. 
During the past year, the Bertelsmmm Stifum.g has brought together a group of  experts 
to deliberate on the impications forOSP  of  an enlarged European Union. The motive 
for this study was  the decision of the Copenhagen ~  Comcil to accept in 
principle the membership of  the associated coWitries of  Central and &mem Europe. 
There  are  cturently  ten  full  or  prospective  associated  eotmtries  (Bulgaria,  Czgch 
Republic,  Estonia,  Hwtgary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovakia  and 
Slovenia).  The  EU already  envisages  that accession  negotiationS  with Cyprus  and 
Malta should commence  six months  after the  conclusion of the IGC  negotiations. 
Whilst not underestimating the problems of future enlargement .negotiations, it is not 
difficult to reach a tally of 25-30 potential member states, taking accomt of  the fact 
that Turkey and Switzerland have also submitted applications for  membership,  that 
Norway  may  do  so  again,  and  without  even  cotmting  Iceland,  Albania  and  the 
successor states of the former Yugoslavia 
Whilst the group was composed of  a 'hard core', comprising representatives from the 
Bertelsmann Stifumg, the Research Group on European Affairs at the University of 
Munich and the Planning Staff of DG lA in the European Commission,  it drew in 
experts for  specific subjects.  The group also took  into accotmt the nwnerous other 
reports which have been published in recent months and which have considered the 
present fimctioning of  the CFSP and subsequently made recommendations for change. 
A full list of  participants and papers submitted to the group is contained ~  amexes 
to this report. This interim report does not attempt to sedc consensus on· evtty. issue, 
but is  rather a reflection of the group's deliberations.  A further  stage~·  ~lve · 
policy planners and experts from the associ8ted countries.  ·  , 
The <llalleuge of F.nlargement 
'  t 
Enlargement of  the EU to the east is one of  the most challenging task$ in ~  bi8toty, 
of European intregration. Europe 11$ never been united ·under demoa"atic •  :~". 
addition of  the three prosperous new member states, Austria, ~  ~-·.];1~-;t9,<, · 
the Union in Janumy 1995 has added to the security  ·.  ·~tQ;lbcf;SU/·-.·_.:_i 
even if  their membership has aeated further problems ~~-~:119~,  ':  ,  •. > 
of  their neutrality. The aa:ession of  the three mini-states of  sOulh-eaStJ~~~.(Mrllta,  .. · . .  ·. 
Cyprus and Slovenia) is unlikely to pose major difficulties fot the CFSP Ot~·~ 
although  the division of Cyprus  remains  a  ~ous  problem. 'The 11»\ior  .~llmge 
comes  from  the  accession of the  countries  of central  and  eastern Europe,  and  in 
particular their  understandable  desire  for  security  guarantees  from  the  WEU  and 
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NATO. What kind of  power will this enlarged European Union seek to become ? Will 
it seek a global or regional role ? Will it seek to create a military projection capability 
- or will it be content to act as a civilian power ? Can a European Union stretching 
from the Barents  Sea to the Black  Sea,  from the Atlantic Ocean to the Baltic Sea, 
agree on common  foreign and security policy  interests,  and on the  reso~  to be 
devoted to defending these  interests  ? How should  it be represented to the outside 
world ? These are among the most pressing questions when considering the future of 
CFSP in an enlarged Union. 
The Stmtegic Fnvimnment 
Although  there  are  no  major  security  threats  facing  the  EU  at  present,  there  is 
increasing instability to the east and south of  the Union. An enlarged EU, which will 
have Russia as its principal neighbour, cannot be indifferent to a worsening political 
and economic environment in its immediate neighbourhood  It will be vital, therefore, 
for the EU to maintain a frrm, long-tenn commitment in support of  the reform process 
in Russia and Ukraine.  Hence the importance of fully  implementing the Partnership 
and  Cooperntion  Agreement  (PCA)  and  indeed  further  intensifying relations  with 
Moscow  and  Kiev.  To  the  south,  the  EU  is  embarking  on  an  ambitious  new 
relationship with the countries of north Africa It will be important to maintain the 
momentum of this policy even in the face of inevitable setbacks. 
The United States will  continue to  be the EUs principal ally.  Contractual relations 
should be expanded gradually, but a new transatlantic treaty will only be relevant if 
the EU can demonstrate  that it is capable of  opernting a credible and effective CFSP. 
A realistic medium to  long term aim would  be an enlarged Union - deepened and 
widened -which would share a mutual assistance guarantee with each other and which 
would continue to share a mutual assistance guarantee with the US  as a result of a 
new  transatlantic treaty  based  on  a genuine  partnership  between the  EU  and  US. 
Together, the EU and US should have a security relationship with Russia and Ukraine. 
The Need for an FlTective CFSP 
The  1995  enlargement to  include  Austria,  Finland  and  Sweden  has  increased the 
resources  available  for  CFSP  but  has  further  complicated  the, decision-making 
structure. A 25-30 member EU will require a refonned  CFSP if  it wishes to be treated 
as a credible actor in global diplomacy. Although there is a strong case for abolishing 
the pillar structure created at  Maastricht,  it  is unlikely that such a change will be · 
agreed  at the IGC.  Hence  refonn proposals  need to  focuss  on practical near-term 
improvements, including : 
- conception : the need to create a European planning staff 
- decision-making :  the need to take CFSP decisions with non-defence implications 
by qualified majority voting. This would only be JX>SSible mder a  refonned voting 
system  in  Council  in  which  there  was  a  greater  correlation  between  votes  and 
population. One possible model is proposed in this report (see annex four). 
- execution : the need for the Presidency and q>mmission to work closely together to 
ensure a better implementation of EU decisions tmder CFSP I 
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- representation : the existing six-monthly rotation system of the Union  ~idency 
should be replaced,  eith~ by a) an elected Presidency with a longer period in office, 
or  b)  a  strengthened  role  for  the  Commissioner  responsible  for  CFSP.  The 
establishment of  a separate body (Mr CFSP) would only create confusion and detract 
from moves to improve the coherence of  the EUs external actions. 
1be Defence Dimemion 
Given the economic weight of  the EU, the world increasingly expects it to take on a 
greater  role  in  world  affairs.  Whilst  it  is  inevitable  and right that the  EU would 
continue to concentrate on its immediate neighbourhood, particularly to the east and 
south, it will have to increase its presence on the world stage. At present this is done 
mainly  through  the  exercise  of soft power - the  use of economic,  financial  and 
political instruments in order to promote EU objectives. But in future the credibility 
of the EU's diplomacy  will  be unnecessarily weakened unless  it also develops  an 
independent military capability or 'common defence'. 
The vehicle for  this effort must be the WEU,  already  designated in the Maastrich 
Treaty as "an integral part of  the development of  the EU". The US strongly supports 
an effective and credible European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), and there 
is  a  growing consensus  that  the  establishment  of an  ESDI  would  strengthen not 
weaken transatlantic relations.  The WEU should gradually be phased  into the EU, 
perhaps initially as a separate pillar. Meanwhile, even in the absence of  the fonnal 
mutual defence guarantee,  it is inconceivable that member states would not respond 
with all the means at their disposal to an  act of  aggression on a member state. Given, 
moreover, that all ten associated cotmtries wish to join the WEU (and NATO), there 
will be increasing pressure on the other five (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and 
Sweden) to match their full participation in CFSP with full membership ofWEU (and 
NATO). 
It would be wrong to  give Russia a veto on \\EUINAID enlargement  WEU and 
NAID membership should be available to all EU members who wish to join and 
satisfy the requirements of  membership. On the other hand, it is importaut to recognise 
the legitimate concerns of  the Russian government For example, it could be agreed 
that no nuclear weapons would be based in any of  the new NA10 members. And, 
following the precedent set by East Germany's absorption into NA10, 1he Alliance 
should agree to include the forces of  its new members in Central and Eastern Europe 
within its own collective ceiling for the purposes of. the CFE Treaty.  The pevious 
allocation of  these states would then be available for distributioo ~  Russia and 
other  former  Soviet  republics.  Adherence  to  these  limits  would,  of course,  be 
dependent on Russia continuing to abide by the constraints of  the CFE Treaty. 
F.Dbugement caooot be a 'one -way stJeef, with existing members ofWEU and NA10 
providing secmity to new membels without expecting anything in rdlm. &isting 
members  have  a right  to expect ·that their  prospective  partners,  as  part of their 
preparation for  membership,  devote  the  resources  necessary  to make  milibuy co-
operation possible. In orde( to advance their cases for membership, these states will 
need to invest a considerable proportion of  their limited defence resources into efforts 
to shift to NATO/ WEU standards. 
Prospective new members cannot be expected to spend more on defence, proportional J 
to  their  national  income,  than  do  existing  WEU  members.  As  their  prosperity 
increases,  however,  it  would  be  reasonable  for  them  to  increase  the size of their 
contribution to collective military efforts. Moreover, there is considerable scope within 
existing allocations for defence for  a shift of resources  into capabilities that would 
more directly contribute to common efforts. 
All WEU members should be expected to  ~ntribute forces or resol.lt'CP') to operations 
authorised by WEU.  It would be inefficient for every comtry to take part in every 
operation.  Over a period of time,  however,  national  contributions overnll should be 
roughly proportional to national capabilities. The WEU Planning Cell might consider 
monitoring progress in this regard for consideration by the WEU Council. 
There may be some scope for the idea of some form of military 'division of labour' 
between  WEU  member  states  on  fimctional  lines,  with some  states  (for example) 
emphasising naval  contributions  and  others  gromd forces.  But this should not be 
extended to a geographical division of  labour, since, by appearing to endorse the idea 
of  national 'spheres of influence', it would tend to undermine rather than strengthen 
a common European  approach.  Some countries  may  have more  military resources 
available for particular aieas  by  virtue of geography  - for example Sweden in the 
Baltic or Italy in the Mediterranean.  But a primary purpose of a common defence 
policy is to ensure that members can rely on other members for support, wherever that 
support is needed._ 
In the short term European defence may  be facilitated by the emergence of  a 'core 
group'  of states  most  ready  and  willing  to  undertake  collective  action.  But  the 
organisation of ad hoc  'coalitions of the willing'  in response to particular crises is 
unlikely to contribute to the strengthening of  CFSP. Rather, there is a danger that such 
coalitions will  be regarded as  a reflection of the CFSP's weakness,  illustrating the 
very  real  risk  that,  with  the  Soviet  threat  gone,  European  defence  will  become 
increasingly 'renationalised.' 
Inc~ing  the cost-effectiveness of European defence 
The 15 members of the EU spent the equivalent of $177 billion on defence in 1993: 
less than the $297 billion spent by the US, but more than double Russia's $77 billion 
and arotmd four times Japan's $40 billion Yet much of the impressive total budget 
is used to duplicate the national capabilities of  fellow EU members, rather than make 
a net addition to the EU' s military strength. 
Budgetary limitations preclude extensive duplication of  assets already provided by the 
US; and the EU has no interest in seeking to replicate the us·s ·capabilities for l&rge-
scale pawa:- projection. Thece is a strong case, howevtr, for a p:ogr8inme of targeted 
investment, <X'g8l1ised on a European level, to remedy the most obVioiiJ ~ciencies: 
for example in airlift, intelligence and conmunications.  .  _,.  .~ 
In o:dec to fimd selective imp"ovements of  this sort, ~defence  -must become 
more oost-effective.  Thece is coosiderable potential for ~-·if~  are 
prepared  to  Seriously  address  the  enonnous  ·inefficiencies  as  a ·  ·resWt· ·of  the 
ftagmentation of  defence provision into fifteen separate national fon:es.·  : · -'<  )  , 
The_ WEU should sponsor a series of studies of the practiCalities of ~on  of 
pam~~ ~~  of  ~efence provision,  including details of potential savings, 
unphcations  for  training,  infrastructure,  equipment,  etc.  First candidates  for  such 
studies, which might be conducted both on a WEU and a sub-regional level,  might include air defence, surface navies (learning from the Belgian/Dutch experience) and 
contributions to NATO and WEU ground forces. 
Considerable potential for savings also exists in the procurement budgets for Europe's 
armed forces.  Where the US has only one advanced fighter tu1der devel9pment,  the 
EU member states have three- Eurofighter 2000, Rafale and Gripen- at a total cost 
(for development only) of $24 billion. A similar picture of  duplication is repeated in 
tanks, helicopters, submarines, missiles and many other areas. In contrast to the rapid 
reorganisation of the US  defence industry,  European defence companies  have been 
relatively slow to consolidate and reorganise. Despite the growing costs involved, the 
protection of  'national champions' remains a high priority for many European defence 
ministries. 
If European  defence  industries  are  to  be  able  to  provide  the  equipment  which 
European anned forces  need  at a price they can afford,  the pace of change· in the 
industry needs to accelerate. European governments need to accept that in the long nm 
the Europe defence industry can only compete with US producers, even within Europe  · 
itself, by reducing its surplus capacity, consolidating purchases on a European scale, 
and allO'wing genuine competition for defence orders on a Europe-~de  basis. In tenns 
of defence procurement, there are major financial  savings to be made as a result of 
closer integration of defence markets.  A 1992 study  for the European Commission 
already  estimates  the cost of procuring defence  goods  and  services  on a national, 
rather than a European, basis as ECU 6-9 billion. In an enlarged EU, the case for co-
operation, and the resulting savings, is correspondingly greater. 1  .  Introduction 
The  end  of the  Cold  War  means  that  the  European  Union  now  has  an  historic 
opportunity to unite the European continent on a democratic basis for the first time in 
histocy.  Enlargement  to the  East  is  in1portru.Lt  not  only  for  economic,  but  also  for 
political, strategic and moral reasons.  Yet,  in order to fulfil this historic mission, the 
leaders of  the EU will have to face the need for radical change. Difficult d(..Cisions will 
be needed, not only in economic policy, but also in foreign and security policy. One 
of the main purposes of the IGC will  be to agree upon the necessary measures that 
will be needed in order to prepare for enlargement. 
This  interim report,  which  is  intended to contribute to the discussion of what those 
measures might be, is the result of  a working group established in the summer of 1994 
by  the  Bertelsmann  Stifumg,  in  close  co-operation  with  the  Research  Group  on 
European Affairs at the University of  MUnich and the Planning Staff of  DCHA in the 
European Commission. The working group was comprised of  a core element from all 
three  institutions,  enriched  by  other foreign  and  security policy experts  who  were 
invited to submit papers and participate in meetings. One of the innovative features 
of the working group was  its  mix of officials  from  the EU,  WEU and NATO (all 
participating in their personal capacities) as well as academics and researchers from 
various  European  colllltries.  A full  list of participants  and  the papers  submitted  is 
contained in Annexes  1 and 2. 
The  working  group  had  a  broad  mandate  ''to comider the  implicatiom  of future 
enlargements for the CFSP of the European Union".  A second phase of the group's 
work will involve experts from the associated COlllltries of  Central and Eastern Europe. 
The group commenced its reflections during the enlargement negotiations with four 
EFTA colllltries. It took their accession, and the eventual accession of  the associated 
states to the east and south, for granted. The working hypothesis was thus an enlarged 
Union of  25 or more member states. 
The group is aware of  related research being lllldertaken elsewhere, and has sought to 
promote the cross-fertilisation of  ideas. Given the scope of  the problems examined, it 
is  also aware that this  interim report cannot  be a comprehensive  SUIVey  of all  the 
implications  of enlargement  on  CFSP.  Nevertheless  the  group  considers  that  it is 
justified  in  publishing its  interim  report  at  this juncture as  a contribution  to  the 
discussion leading up to the IGC in 1996. Accordingly,  it is intended to submit the 
report to the Reflection Group under Mr Westendotp and to make it available to the 
European  institutions,  governments  and  parliaments  in  the  member  states  and 
associated states, as well as the wider public. 
1 2.  The ClJallenge of F.nlargement 
The fiiSt  stage of the enlargement of the EU made JX>ssible by the end of the Cold 
War has  already taken place.  It began with Austria's formal  application. to join the 
European Commtmity in July  1989, and culminated with the acceptance of Austria, 
Finland and Sweden into the European Union in January  1995. The Cornmtmity that 
began with only 6 members in 1957 is now a l.6nion of 15. 
Yet,  even before the  full  implications  of this  latest  stage  have  been  absorbed,  the 
Union is already well advanced in its preparations for its most ambitious enlargement 
so far. The Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 accepted in principle the goal 
of  membership for the associated countries of  Central and Eastern Europe. Following 
the  Cannes  European  Council  in June  1995,  there  are  ten  current,  or soon to  be, 
associated countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), all of  whom view EU membership as part 
of their security strategy.  The Etropean Council has also accepted that negotiations 
with Cyprus and Malta should commence six months after the conclusion of  the IGC 
negotiations. There remain applications from Turkey and Switzerland on the table, and 
it is  JX>ssible that Norway will  also  make another application, perhaps followed by 
Iceland Although the obstacles to rapid enlargement remain formidable,  it remains 
likely that, by 2005  or 2010, the Union will have a membership of between 25 and 
30  states,  even  if Turkey,  Albania and  most  of the successor states of the former 
Yugoslavia remain outside. 
Such a radical  enlargement provides a wealth of opJX>rtunities.  But it also presents 
risks. If  measures are not taken to defme and agree the essential common interests of 
the  Union  and  to  reform  the  decision-making process,  the process of enlargement 
could weaken,  rather than strengthen, the cohesion and effectiveness of the Union's 
CFSP.  The  1996 IGC must,  therefore,  consider reform of the CFSP  in light of the 
prospect  of a  substantially  enlarged  membership,  a  radically  different  strategic 
environment, and against the background of the changing nature of  security. 
The importance of CFSP refonn will be increased because of  the very nature of  the 
enlargement exercise. A result of  enlargement to a Union of  25-30 is likely to be that 
the EU will find itself directly bordering areas which suffer from political instability 
and/or  economic  underdevelopment  (for  example,  Russia,  Ukraine,  the  Maghreb 
cotmtries, with only a tenth of average EU levels of  GNP per capita).  A strong and 
effective CFSP will be vital if  the EU is to manage relatiom with its neighboms in a 
way that is constructive rather than antagonistic. 
Alfi1ria, Flnland and Sweden 
The  accession  of Austria,  Sweden  and  Finland  has  significantly  changed  the 
geopolitical contours of the Union.  Nordic enlargement means that Finland's  1200 
kilometer border with Russia is also an external frontier of  the Union, whilst Austrian 
enlargement  means  that the Union's  frontiers  have moved even closer to war-tan 
fonner  Yugoslavia  Both  Finland  and  Austria  are  thus  more  directly  exposed  to · 
security risks than most other member states of  the Union. 
2 I 
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The  addition  of three  prosperous  new  members  to  the  EU  in  January  1995  has 
significantly enhanced the security resources of  the EU, even if  their neutral status has 
complicated plans for a common defence.  Finland and Sweden are playing an active 
role in promoting reconciliation between Russia and the three Baltic republics, and all 
three  are  promoting cooperation between the  EU  and central  and  eastern  Europe. 
Despite  some  recent  reductions,  all  three  newcomers  remain  amongst  the  most 
generous providers of development assistance to the Third World 
The  three  new  states  also  bring  significant  contributions  to  the  EU' s  military 
capabilities.  Sweden  provides  significant  military  resources,  as  well  as  a defence 
industrial base of  considerable sophistication (especially in combat aircraft, submarines 
and fast attack craft) for a country of its size. Although less 'high tech' than Sweden, 
Finland also possesses significant highly trained armed forces and is well experienced 
in managing relations with Russia Both countries provide troops for the UNPROFOR 
mission  in  former  Yugoslavia  Austria  has  given  a  lower  budgetmy  priority  to 
defence, which has traditionally been based on militia-based area defence. But recent 
policy changes have heralded a shift towards border defence, and a 15,000 strong rnpid 
reaction force  is to be established. 
Table 1 
Defence reso.oces of new EU members (1994) 
Austria 
Flnland 
Sw·eden 
Poptilation 
8.0 nulhon 
5.1  million 
8.8 million 
Ai1lied forces 
51,250 
31,200 
64,000 
Defence BUdget ($US) 
$1,600 mtlhon 
$1,600 million 
$4,800 million 
The  neutrality  of the three  during the. Cold  War  did not prevent  each playing an 
important  international  role,  particularly  through  the  UN.  They  have  a  long and 
distinguished history of  involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, bringing a depth 
of experience that  is  invaluable  for  CFSP.  Moreover,  all  three new EU members 
(  w1like Ireland and Switzerland) have joined Partnership for Peace, and now take part 
in the WEU as observers. Full membership of  WEU and NATO membership remains 
a matter of considerable controversy, but the continued relevance of  neutrality in a 
Europe  without  blocs  is  tmder  debate  in  all  three  countries,  and  elite  opinion 
recognises  that  WEU  and  NA10  membership  is  likely  to  be  the  long  term 
consequence of  joining the EU. 
The aurent observer status of  these three newcomers, together with those ofDemnatk 
and Ireland, complicates the~  of  integrating defence provision and planning into 
the CFSP. If  the WEU is to become fully integrated into the EU at some stage, this 
anomaly  will  have to be resolved  Yet  the practical  consequence of this anomaly 
should not be overstated The international policies of  the three fit easily with those 
of  the other twelve members, and none seems likely to become a persistent 'footnote' 
state. In the event of  a serious deterioration in the European security situation, all three 
states would consider WEU and NATO membership more urgently. In  the absence of 
3 such a crisis,  the  EU's new members  still seem likely to  be net contributors to  its 
capability  for  providing security,  both  in  its  immediate neighbourhood and further 
afield 
The Three 'Mini-States' of South-F..$tem Europe 
At the European Cotu1cil of  Jtu1e  1994 in Corfu it was agreed that Cyprus and Malta 
would be involved in the next phase ofEU ePlargement. Both states are small (Malta 
with 0.4 million inhabitants would be the smallest EU member by  population and 
Cyprus  with  0.7 million would be  the  third smallest after  Luxembourg),  but each 
would pose significant problems for the EU, not least in the institutional  field In  both 
cases,  the  delicate  question  of their  representation  as  'mini-states'  in  the  Unon's 
institutions would have to be resolved in accession negotiations. 
In the case of  Malta, another issue would be the country's constitutional commitment 
to non-alignment. The rationale for this commitment, conceived as an attempt to stand 
back  from  the  Cold  War  confrontation,  has  largely  disappeared,  and  Malta's 
application to join the EU appears to signify a wish to align itself with the EU as 
partial protection against the possibility of instability to  its  south.  Nevertheless,  it 
appears likely that Malta will, at least initially, not want to join either WEU or NA1D. 
Table 2 
Defence resourees of the 'mini-states' (1994) 
cypi1ti 
Malta 
Slovenia 
Poptilation 
0.7 mdhon 
0.4 million 
2.0 million 
Ariried forees 
10,000 
1,850 
8,100  ' 
JJefence BUdget ($US) 
$511  rrulhon 
$26 million 
$226 million 
EU membership for Cyprus clearly poses problems as long as no lasting settlement to 
the island's division, acceptable to both communities on the island and to Greece and 
Turkey, has been found At present this seeJm unlikely. As a resul~ the EU faces the 
prospect of  having a new member state (on whose territory another member state has· 
'sovereign'  bases) which does not control  a large part of its national.teni.tory,  and 
which may well hope and seek to enlist its fellow EU members in its quest to regain 
that control.  -
A third 'mini-state• -Slovenia, with 2 million inhabitants- is the richest Iq)Ublic of  , 
the former  Yugoslav  states  and  as such woold face relatively l1.lOde$t problems in 
preparing itself for EU membership. Slovenia could be expected to apply to join  ·the 
WEU and NATO, and to be accepted with little protest from either existing~ 
or from <$.er powers. With the settlement of  its dispUte with Italy, it has no-tcnitorial 
disputes with its neighboms. It may even, by virtue of its long history as a Yugoslav  . 
republic, be able to bring some useful expertise to EU mediation eftbrts in other parts 
of  former Yugoslavia Slovenian membership o~  the EU would add finther to the need 
to reform EU decision-making and representational mechanisms.  In other respects, 
however, it would pose far fewer problems than  other prospective members. 
4 The accession of  Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia will not expose the Union to significant 
new risks, and, given the small size of  the states concerned, the economic impact of 
their membership will be marginal for existing member states. But their membership 
will  create  significant  problerm  for  the  EU' s  institutional  structures  and  CFSP 
procedures. 
The Centrnl and Eastern Emupean ~ociated  states 
In sharp contrast, the prospect of membership for the six associated states in Central 
and  Eastern  Europe  (Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Htmgary,  Poland,  Romania,  and 
Slovakia) is likely to pose much more fimdamental challenges for the EU, the meeting 
of  which are likely to require radical change in many aspects of  Union policy, from 
regional policy to agriculture,  from  industrial policy to internal secwity. Not least, 
because of the central importance of secwity as a motivating force  in the desire of 
Central and Eastern Europe to join the EU,  enlargement will profotmdly affect the 
nature of  the CFSP. 
What unites the six applicants of  Central and Eastern Europe is that, for almost half 
a  centtny  after  1945,  their  foreign  and  secwity  policies  were  (with  the  partial 
exception of  Romania) subordinated to the requirements of  the Soviet Union. The last 
Russian troops only left Poland in September 1993.  Precisely because of  this negative 
experience, all six have expressed a strong wish to be full members of  both WEU and 
NATO,  as well as the EU, as soon as possible. But the practical problerm involved 
in the transition to full membership in these institutions are considerable. 
As relatively poor states, the Central and Eastern European applicants are tmlikely to 
contribute significantly to  the  'soft power'  resources  available  for  the  conduct  of 
CFSP.  They  would  appear to  have  greater potential  in  the provision  of military 
resources, with 830,000 armed forces personnel last year (see table) equivalent to 400/o 
of  the strength of  the EU's fifteen existing member states. Yet this gives a misleading 
indication of  the value of  Central and Eastern European forces for collective defence. 
The imperative of  economic reform in preparation for EU membership, together with 
the absence of any immediate military threat from the east, has severely limited the 
resources available for defence. For example, the Czech republic has fixed its defence 
~udget at 2.5% of  GNP, down from around ?0/o in the late 1980s. Training standards 
are decreasing, and personnel numbers are in most cases likely to decline substantially 
over  the  next few  years.  Arsenals,  although often large,  consist - of 
Soviet  models,  and  interoperability  of equipment,  anmnmition  and  logistics  with 
NATO' WEU forces is therefore virtually non-existent Considerable investment Will 
be required to bring forces up to the standards of  even the less Well-equipped members 
ofWEU.  -
5 Table 3 
Defence resourees of Centml and Eastern European states (1994) 
POptilation  Ariiied forces  Defence BUdget (SUS) 
BUlgaria  8.4 mdhon  101,900  $586 nnlhon 
CZechR  10.4 million  92,900  $770 million 
Hungary  I  0.4 million  74,500  $637 million 
Poland  38.8 million  283,600  $2,200 million 
Romania  23.2 million  230,500  $1,100 million 
Slovakia  5.5 million  47,000  $315 million 
In certain specialist areas, the com1tries of  Central and Eastern Europe may be able to 
make a useful contribution to NATO and WEU capabilities for peacekeeping. As of 
May  1994,  the  six  states  were  contributing  a  total  of 3,804  personnel  to  UN 
peacekeeping missions: around the same number as the UK. The countries of  Central 
and Eastern Europe are also starting to make a useful contribution to WEU and NATO 
through providing access to training facilities  (for example,  recent Franco-Getman-
Polish exercises in Poland) and fly-over rights (for example, the use of  Htmgary for 
the AWACS mission for the control of  the no-fly zone over Bosnia). In addition, some 
Central and Eastern European com1tries - such as ~Poland, Romania and Slovakia -
have inherited large defence industries.  But given the reductions in national defence 
budgets  and  the  highly  competitive  nature  of international  markets,  there  is  little 
prospect for retaining more than a few specialist elements of  these capabilities. Indeed 
the economic and social problems created by the nmdown of  defence industries may 
increase the difficulties involved in hannonising arms export regulations with those  , 
ofEU and NATO members. 
The Baltic Republics 
The three Baltic republics  are  on the  margins  of mini-state  status  ; Lithuania 3. 7 
million, Latvia, 2.6 million and Estonia 1.6 million inhabitants. Latvi8, Lithuania and 
Estonia also have particular problems as a consequence of  their_ fmmec incorporation  -
into the Soviet Union and their geographical situation between Russia on. two sides 
(the Kaliningrad enclave and St Petersburg) and Belarus on the third. ·Although the 
current Russian govennnent appears to accept that the three republia are not part ·of 
the 'near abroad', the presence of  large Russian minorities in both Estooia and ·Latvia 
is a source of  potential tension in future. It will be important, tha-efore, f.<r the _FJJ to  · -
continue to press both sides to improve their relatons - along the lines ootlinextbl.1he: . 
Stability Pact  ·  .  .  -
The Baltic states are progressively aligning their foreign and security poli~  with~.  _ 
EU as a first step towards eventual full membership of  the EU, WEU and NA~.::  In~~·. ·· ·. 
contrast to other former  ~et  republics, the three Baltic rq>Ublia have ~  :·  .. 
association  agreements  with  the  EU  and;  have  been  granted,  associate  WEU  · · 
membership. Denmark, Finland, Notway, Sweden, and the UK are asisting the new 
states  establish a joint infantcy  peacekeeping  ~ion,  and  several  EU states  are 
assisting in the provision of equipment and training.  , 
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Table 4 
Defence resourees of the Baltic republics (1994) 
POputiiion  Ai1Jied forees 
&toma  1.6 mdhon  2,500 
latvia  2.6 million  2,300 
lithuania  3.8 million  4,900 
SecmitrGuanmtees 
DeFence BUdget (SUS) 
$20 mtlhon 
$51  million 
$96 million 
The inclusion of  the Central and East European states and the Baltic states in the EU 
would mise a number ofvecy sensitive security issues. First, it raises the prospect of 
possible EU involvement in disputes between Central and Eastern Emopean states. 
Acting together, the existing EU states would be able to bring ~iderable  resources 
(economic, diplomatic, even military) to bear to ensure a peaceful outcome to such 
disputes.  In order to organise such an  outcome,  however,  the EU would need to 
overcome the problems  that  might  be  posed if  one  of the new members  directly 
involved in a dispute were to use its veto power to block any joint action. A first step 
should be to introduce the possibility of  "positive abstention" allowing for the EU to 
take action if no direct opposition is voiced If  the Union's eastward ·enlargement is 
not accompanied by measures designed to allow for  this possibility, there is a real 
danger that it may become increasipgly difficult to agree CFSP joint action. 
Second, the enlargement of the EU raises the issue of security guarantees by WEU 
(and NATO) against aggression from non-members. The pre-eminent problem in this 
regard is concern, most intensely felt in the three Baltic republics and Poland, about 
future developments in Russia It is clear~  in the absence of  radical change in the 
organisation of  Emopean defence, WEU on its own will not be able to offer credible 
military guarantees to these states. The EU therefore cannot consider the implications 
of enlargement  without  also  considering  how  to  link  this  process  with  NATO 
enlargement. 
In conclusion, both because of  the· continuing possibility of  conflict within the region, 
and  because  of the remote  but  real  risk of a revived Russian  threat,  the security 
relationship between existing EU members and the prospective members from Cen1ral 
and Eastern Emope is bound to be an asymmetrical one. Enlargement of  the EU to the 
East is in the long tenn security interests of  existing members, consolidating the gains 
that democlacy has made in the region and deepening the seauity perilnetec of  1hc 
Union.  Yet the Union should not underestimate the seriommess of  the commitment 
involved for all EU and WEU members, including those with tittle U. no history of 
commitmeot to Central Europe. An irnpottaut part of  1he 1996 ~  8nd bey~  · 
will be to educate EU members of this reality.  An appropi8te step in 1his. ~ 
woold be to ~  the implicit security ~  of  EU membership into .an.cit · 
guaraJtee, with all member states accepting an article V type of  mutual:~ 
clm~  ·  · 
\ 
7 3. The Stmtegic Emironment 
In the complex post Cold War international environmen4 security  policy is no longer 
focussed only on containing the threat of  military attack on Western Europe.  Rather 
than relying primarily on defence and deterrence,  European security _now requires a 
multifaceted approach in which a variety of imtruments are used together to reduce 
the risks of instability and insecurity on Europe's  fronliers  and in its neighbouring 
states.  For security policy to be successful,  it needs to be well resourced, swift and 
flexible.  In  ctUTent  circumstances,  it  is  more  likely to  be  about  the  'soft security' 
provided by instruments such as human rights monitoring, trade policy, economic and 
technical  assistance than about the  'hard security'  provided by  military defence.  If 
risks to European security develop to the stage at which European soldiers have to risk 
their lives, then these preventive policies will already, to a large exten4 have failed. 
The Stability Pact is a good example of  the type of  EU preventive diplomacy that is 
likely to be most relevant in the new environment.  In this case the EU was able to 
deploy its considerable leverage to encourage states in central and eastern Europe to 
address some of the fimdamental  causes of instability in their neighbourhood. More 
needs to be done,  and the effectiveness of EU initiatives is still often hampered by 
lack of resources and by 'lowest common denominator'  decision-making rules.  It is 
already clear, however, that in responding to the multiplicity of  challenges it faces, the 
EU will need to define its security policy in a broad sense, giving due weight to the 
importance of  policy instruments that are outside the fonnal purview of  the CFSP. In 
other words, there must be greater coherence between the three pillers. 
Of all the organisations involved in European secmity, only the EU has the potential 
to play a global security role. The military imtrument of  policy will remain important, 
both as a background presence and in direct application But even when used, it will 
rarely be as dominant in policy as in, the past. Nor, accordingly,  should it command 
the degree of  priority in resource allocation which it was given during the Cold War. 
Many of  the potential challenges resulting from instability and conflict in the East and 
South, such as increased  refugee flows, criminality and narcotics traffic, cross-border 
environmental  pollution,  and disruption of energy  supplies,  are  not susceptible  to 
militacy solutions. 
Reldions with neighboUIS 
In addition to enlargement, a major concern of  the EU is relations with neighbouring 
states who will not be joining the Union. In each case, the EU will have an ~est 
in promoting stability and prosperity so that ·the consequences of~-- illegal 
migration, crime, etc ~ do not spill over onto European Union ~- 'N9ne of the 
ED's neighbours to the east and south currently pose a direct mi1ii8ry ~·to".~ 
Union.  But future political change could lead to such a  threat developiJl& ·  and the 
CFSP will have a central role in seeking to prevent such an occurrence.  ·  ·  · 
.  I 
Most immediately, the EU has a direct interest in~  a lasting 8nd .;._.political· 
settlement in former Yugoslavia The EU's inability to develop ·a lJI1ite6 and·~bl~ 
policy towards the wars in Croatia and Bosnia is eloquent testimony to· the-need for 
a coherent CFSP that has 'teeth;. With four of  1he new melnbers' of  an eil1arged EU 
(Slovenia, Hungmy, Romania, and Bulgaria), as \veil as Greece, bordering at least one 
of the former Yugoslav republics, this will increase the Eli's interest in stability in 
8 this region, and thus perhaps increase the readiness of its members to devote scarce 
resources to the area. (Yet it could also result in a paralysis in decision-making if  no 
progress is made in moving away from the ability of single member states to block 
decisions within the CFSP. Without CFSP refonn, the result is likely to be a finther 
strengthening of  the tendency to rely on ad hoc bodies (such as the Conta€t Group on 
Bosnia) as the primmy instnnnents for multilatd:'al diplomacy.) 
There can be no doubting the crucial i.fllJnrtance of developments in Russ;a for the 
future of European secmity. A democratic, cooperative Russia will greatly facilitate 
the management of regional and global security problems. It will be vital, therefore, 
for the EU to ensure the success of  the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, and 
to maintain a finn, long-term commitment in support of  the reform process in Russia 
(and  Ukraine).  Failure  to  stabilise  Russian  democracy  could  result  in  a  finther 
breakdown of  order, with all the concomitant risks of  environmental spillover, massive 
refugee flows and the spread of  organised crime. It is also possible that the failure of 
economic reform could lead to increased support for political extremism, which might 
in tmn lead to a worsening of  relations between Russia and neighbouring state In the 
first instance  this could affect the three Baltic states, all of  whom have a common 
border with Russia and two  of which (Estonia and Latvia) have significant ethnic 
Russian minorities. 
An enlarged Union to the east should not signal a shift of  EU concern away from the 
Union's southern and south-eastern neighbours.  Turkey,  a long-standing member of 
NATO and still a candidate for eventual EU membership,  is likely to be of growing 
importance  in EU foreign policy. 
Finally, the EU cannot isolate itself from the long term effects of  growing poverty and 
underdevelopment Continuing tmderdevelopment in North Africa and the Middle East 
fuels support for  political extremism The resultant flows of refugees could in twn 
exacerbate domestic tensions  within several  EU members,  and might conceivably, 
albeit in the long term, lead to the development of  significant military threats to the 
Union.  Some EU members are clearly more immediately concerned with events in 
Algeria than others. But the whole Union will. be affected if  solutions to the endemic 
problems of  this region are not found 
In every direction,  an expanded EU faces  a similar choice. If it is able to develop 
good relations with its neighbours, and perhaps hold out the prospect of  membership -
or at least close partnership - then it can help ensure its own secmity. But if  it finds 
itself surrounded by an  'arc of aisis', the Union's own internal stability will itself 
be a fragile one.  · 
RelatioiB widl die us 
The US  oon•nibumt to  the Atlantic Alliance  remains a ~  of the EU's 
secuity. But US policy towards Europe is dvmging as a result of  the end of  the C!old 
War, cbntstic p-i<xities and bJdget8ly pressures. Current disagreements over Bosnia 
sboold not obscue the fact tbat the ties binding Europe to the us remain strong. 
Wasbingtm is now a strmg supporter of  ESDI and fiwO\D'S both enlargement of  the 
~  Dl the ~  of an effeaive CFSP.  Despite  this  generally qtimistic 
plebe, there ranams some cmam that,  in the absence of an overriding common 
thrca1.,  the  smse  of  connnon  transatlantic  pmpose  might  erode  over  time. 
Coosequently, there is a revival of  interest i·: a transatlantic treaty, in which the whole 
9 range of relations - economic,  political,  and military - between the US  and the EU 
would be integrated into a single process. A new transatlantic treaty, however, would 
only be relevant if the EU can demonstrate that it is capable of operating a credible 
and effective CFSP. A realistic medium to long term aim would be an enlarged Union 
- deepened and widened - which would include a mutu61 security commitment and 
which would continue to share a mutual assistance guarantee with the US as a result 
of  a new transatlantic treaty based on a genuine partnership between the EU and US. 
Together, the EU and US would have a security relationship with Russia and Ukraine. 
Faced with the much more diverse set of risks that characterise the post Cold War 
world,  the  members  of the  EU  can  no  longer  rely  on  the  US  to  take  primary 
responsibility for organising their security. Nor can European states rely on a diversity 
of  national actions or on 'ad hoc' coalitions to meet the considerable  challenges that 
will face the continent over the next two decades. Leaving the primary responsibility 
for  foreign and security policy in the hands of individual states not only erodes the 
bonds of  Union solidarity, particularly given the difficulty of  drawing a clear dividing 
line between foreign policy and other aspects of  policy such as trnde and aid, but it 
also diffuses the resomces that can be applied to the solution of  any single problem, 
and thus diminishes the chances of success.  · 
Relations with the rest of the world 
As global interdependence continues to increase, events elsewhere in the world will 
increasingly impinge on European interests and concerns. In seveml respects, the EU 
is emerging as a significant global actor. It has recently recognised the importance of 
key regions and has produced strategy papers eg on Asia, Africa, South America, the 
Middle East, which need to be followed up with concrete action. 
By acting together, member states can ensure that the EU  plays a key role in shaping 
global regimes. The EU was one of the key actors in the negotiations that led to the 
establishment  of the  World  Trade  Organisation,  talks  that  were  vital  to  Europe's 
prosperity. EU members play an increasingly important part in the deliberations of  the 
IMF and World Bank. EU members accolDlt for just over half  of  global aid spending 
(around $30 billion in 1992). They provide more of  the UN regular budget, as well 
as the budgets of  its specialised agencies, than either the US or Japan. And the EU has 
recently taken a leading role in pushing for effective measures to tackle the problem. 
of global warming, for example at the Berlin Climate Convention in April1995. 
In pursuing external policy goals in these fields, the EU and its members rely mainly 
on economic  and  political  instnnnents.  The  selective  use  of trade  ~ons, 
economic assistance and, where necessacy, anns embargos and economic sanctions can 
have a valuable role to play in signalling the EU's attitude and facilitating peaceful 
change. On the other hand, the continuing use of  these instruments by member states 
on a unilateral basis suggests that there  is still some way to go before a common · 
policy is fully in place. 
:Military capacity will also remain an important element in international diplomacy. 
The EU states are lDllikely ever to match the US's capabilities far power projection, 
so vividly demonstrated in the Desert Storm operation in 1991. Nor is it clear that it 
is necessary or even desirnble for the EU to duplicate this capability. But it will be 
necessary for EU member states to provide increased military resomces in order to 
establish r common defence. As regards peacekeeping missions, many EU members, 
10 HlL.iw  .. uug  H~  Ulr~ latest  rneml:x,'TS,  have  a good  record  in this  regard  And several 
colllltries are now making it a priority to enhance their capabilities for such missions. 
But some EU members could still do more. 
If the European contribution to UN peacekeeping is to increase, however,  it will be 
increasingly  important that it  be  properly co-ordinated.  Many  of the EU's smaller 
members  rely  on  others  to  provide  the  support  for  even  a  small-scale  military 
operation. The case for developing integrated peacekeeping units, on either a regional 
or European level, depending on the nature of  the task involved, is therefore a strong 
one. 
4. The need for an effective CFSP 
Although the CFSP has only been in operation for eighteen months, it has been widely 
criticised  for  its  cumbersome  procedures  and  lack  of effectiveness.  Whilst  it  .is 
indisputable that these problems are likely to increase following enlargement, this does 
not mean that the quest for a more effective CFSP should be abandoned.  The main 
argument in favour of  such a policy is quite simple : in most parts of  the world, the 
EU will either speak with one voice, or its voice will not be heard at all. 
An initial assessment of  the CFSP in operation is not very encouraging. Certainly there 
has been a vast increase in the number of  meetings and a considerable reorganisation 
of the various bureaucracies involved.  The European Commission has established a 
separate Directorate General  (OOlA) to  cover CFSP,  under the mixed authority of 
President Santer and Hans van den Broek ; the ColiDcil has also established a new 
Directorate to  deal  with  CFSP,  headed  by  a British diplomat  ; whilst the  WEUs 
Secretariat has moved from London to Brussels. 
But a number of weaknesses can be cited such as confusion over the pillars which 
operate tmder  different rules  and procedures  ; ambiguity concerning the respective 
roles of  the Presidency and the Commission (disputes over the interpretation of  "fully 
associated")  and  the  fonn  of the  Union's  external  representation.  Some  Foreign 
Ministers holding the Presidency seem to have difficulty in making any distinction 
between representing a national position and an EU position. Furthermore,  in many 
capitals outside Europe, the presence of the EU is conspicuous by its absence. 
Since the TEU came into operation on 1 November 1993, the EU haS agreed a nwnber 
of Joint Actions including : 
- monitoring elections in Russia and in  South Africa 
- providing  hmnanitarian  assistance  in  f011lltT  Yugoslavia  and  establishing  an 
administration for Mostar 
.. supporting the Middle East Peace Process 
- lobbying for the extension of  the NPT 
-~  export guidelines for the use of  dual use goods ; and for anti-personnel 
nunes 
- promoting the Stability Pact to tackle problems concerned with minorities in central 
and eastern Europe 
11 In addition to these "joint actions", a number of "common positions" (ie. alignment of 
policies but not necessarily taking action together or committing resources) have been 
adopted on Libya, Sudan, Haiti, Rwanda, Ukraine and Burundi. 
Whilst these actions have been useful (particularly the Stability Pact with its mixture 
of diplomatic  pressure  and  community  assistance)  in concerting the {iositions  of 
member states on some key issues, they have not led to  increased EU visibility nor 
really decisive action.  The scope has been 1nodest and the added value of  CFSP not 
always  apparent.  It  is  still often the  case that  member states - and particularly the 
larger member states - have preferred to use other mechanisms to pursue their policies. 
In seeking a negotiated settlement to the war in Bosnia, France, Gennany and the UK 
have  worked  primarily  through  the  five-nation  Contact  Group,  leaving  other EU 
members and associates (including those with troops on the ground in Bosnia) without 
an effective voice. 
In part, the lack of decisive EU action has been a consequence of  the wtwillingness 
of member states to accept that they have an interest in common action,· even when 
the  limitations  of any  single  nation  states  to  influence  events  is  reducing.  While 
member states will continue to reserve the ultimate right to unilateral action in foreign 
and  security  policy,  the  Union  has  yet  to  create  even  the  e~ion  that  the 
possibility of  joint action should be thoroughly explored before ~ion  is taken; far less 
the  expectation  that  the  Union  should  be  the  primary  mechanism  for  developing 
multilateral foreign and security policy. 
To create these expectations will require a CFSP that is capable of  responding rapidly 
and effectively to new problems.  While increasing emphasis  is being placed on the 
central role which conflict prevention should play in the Union's security policy, the 
CFSP has yet to develop the mechanisms necessary for  this role to be effective. Until 
it does so, member states will often continue to believe that it is better to rely on a 
combination of national action and ad hoc coalitions. 
The lack of a coherent European voice on many important international matters not 
only weakens the ability of  European states to pursue their interests effectively. It $<> 
makes it more difficult for the international community as a whole to reach consensus. 
By con~  in trade policy, where the EU already acts as a single actor, it makes an 
effective contribution to the management of international regimes. 
With  no  clear  separation  between  economic  and  security  issues,  the  ~culties 
involved in conducting one policy on a community basis, but the other on a ~onal  . 
basis,  are likely to grow over time.  The need for CFSP refOrm will be even·~ .  · 
imperative following enlargement Indeed, the operation of  CFSP on the current b8sis  . 
in an enlarged EU could condemn it to stagnation and  irrel~  .If this ooours,· 
member states- both old and  new~  will increasingly tum to national: action and'ad 
hoc coalitions to achieve their foreign and security policy aims. NATO may be: able 
to play some role in preventing renationalisation of  the military component of  secxaity 
policy. If  there is no coherent  European pillar in a NATO of  30-35, however, NATO· 
may find itself facing the same difficulties in reaching decisi~.  · 
Pressure for change will be increased by the fact that most of  the new. member ~ 
will  have  small  populations,  and  like  smaller members  of the existing EU,  these 
smaller states often do not have the national  fo~ign  policy-making capacity necessary 
to  come  to  an  informed judgement on  problems  outside their immediate  national 
concerns,  far  less  the  power  capabilities  necessary  to  make  a difference  to  their 
12 solution. The smaller member states, like the larger ones, can be expected to protect 
core aspects of their national sovereignty  in security policy,  but they may feel  that 
their interests are served by some shift in the I~  of  decision-making from the larger 
member states towards the EU. 
Proposals for Olange 
Given the prospect of  a substantially enlarged Union in the not too distant future, an 
increasingly unstable international environment and encouragement from the US to 
achieve a credible CFSP,  it is  imperative that the IGC results  in an enhanced and 
effective CFSP. Although an absence of  political will cannot itself be tackled through 
procedural improvements, such improvements, taken together, may reinforce the sense 
of common objectives and common interests,  leading to  a greater propensity to act 
together.  There  is  a  strong  case  for  abolishing  the  'pillar'  system  established  at 
Maastricht, and moving towards integrating the CFSP into the Community structures. 
But such a move would arouse strong opposition from a nwnber of  member states who 
contend that security policy, and in partirular policy with a defence dimension, should 
be treated  differently  from  policy  in  other  areas.  While  not  ruling out  more  far-
reaching ideas in the long tenn, this report focuses on developing proposals for more 
incremental refonn that could reasonably be considered in the IGC. 
The Conceptual Phase 
One of  the main weaknesses of CFSP has been the absence of  a body charged with 
the definition of the essential  common interests of the Union,  monitoring potential 
crisis  situations,  establishing  priorities  and  preparing  options  for  ministers.  An 
awareness of common European interests can be increased by partially pooling the 
Union's capacity for policy analysis. This already takes place to some extent through 
the exchange of infonnation on the  EU telegraphic  COREU network and by joint 
meetings of  policy planning staff from the member states and the Union's institutions. 
Such cooperation is limited, however, and could be enhanced by establishing a joint 
structure for the evaluation of infonnation, policy analysis and preparation of  policy 
actions. There is a urgent need, therefore, for a European Planning Staff, which should 
be a joint Commission-Council body, maintaining close links with WEU and which 
could be enhanced by officials on detachment from member states and perllaps also 
academic specialists. 
The 1EU and recent European Council conclusions provide only a general guide to 
the objectives and priOOties of  the CFSP. This hampers decisive actim when situations 
arise requiring preventive diplOJDaty, aisis managem2Jl « cxmflict reso1uli<n 1he 
Unim's capacity for ac:tim could be enhanced if  it -wa-e to p1XIuce an im•J rqxxt 
and guidelines fix  tbe Union's c:xtemal relations. This coold be a task fir  tbe EUropean 
Planning Staff The Coora1 woo1d then debate the guidelines, baYing fiist ~the 
views  of the  European  Parliammt.  After  Parliammt  bad  givat its opiuioo,  the  · 
guidelines could be revieM:d by the Coora1 and then tmnsmitted to the EuroPean 
Council  fir apJXUYB1.  These  guidelines  would tim aeate tbe paramettJ'S for  EU · 
decision-making m extanal policy during the oourse of  the year.  ·  . 
13 The Decision-making Phase 
Until now unanimity has been required for joint action under the CFSP although,  in 
principle,  the  Treaty  allows  for  decision  by  qualified  IlliYority  on  the  details  of 
implementing measures. This means that the Union's capacity for action can be limited 
by the reluctance of  a single member state. While respecting national prerogatives on 
matters of  vital interest in fundamental areas of foreign and secmity policy, decision-
making rules could be changed to allow for QMV in policy areai not having military 
implications ;  and to pennit member states wishing to take action together, to do so 
within the  framework of the treaty.  Such actions would only be agreed if they  fell 
within the broad guidelines approved by the European Council. Other member states, 
though not necessarily participating directly,  would not be able to prevent the joint 
action from taking place. Indeed, such an approach, which will be even more desirable 
in an enlarged EU, fmds its origin in the declaration attached to the Treaty concerning 
the CFSP,  which  aims  at  preventing the  blockage  of unanimity where  a qualified 
majority exists. 
Obviously there needs to be a reform of  the voting system in the CoWlCil to allow for 
a greater correlation with population size. In the proposal in Annex 4, the weighting 
of votes  is  based on  degressive proportionality.  Accordingly,  for  up to  18  million 
population member states would be given one vote per 1.5 million ; between 18 and 
45  million, they would receive additionally one vote per 3 million ; and beyond 45 
million they would rceive additonally one vote per 5 million. 
Representation 
The EU' s credibility in the rest of  the world continues to be undermined by both the 
six-monthly rotation of the  Council  Presidency and  the  'troika' system of external 
representation. Under the lEU, the Presidency was given an increased role as regards 
external representation of  the Union. The Commission was also tasked with ensuring 
coherence between the pillars. It is doubtful, however, whether the present six-monthly 
rotation system can be maintained in an enlarged Union.. Even with adjustnlents to the 
troika rotation, one cannot escape the fact that future enlargements will concern mainly 
small and indeed very small states. The ED's insistence on having four seats for its 
'troika' at the ASEAN Regional Forum's first summit in Bangkok in summer 1994, 
to take but one example, was a subject of some derision amongst Asian states. 1he 
system only serves to confirm the image of a Union that is so internally ftagile that 
it  is  willing to  sacrifice  effectiveness  of representation  in the  interests ·of equity 
between all its member states. 
As  far  as  the  Commission's  role  is  concerned,  it  is  fully  associated  ~th the 
implementation of the CFSP and has the right of initiative, a right shared with the . 
Presidency  and other member  states.  The Commission  is uniquely well  placed to 
provide an independent European perspective and has demonstrated this in the past 
year by preparing numerous, well-received papers covering EU policy towards central 
and  eastern Europe,  Russia,  Ukraine,  the Baltics,  the Mediterranean,  Asia,  Japan, 
Mercosur,  etc.  Member  states  inevitably  approach  problems  from  a  national 
perspective  whilst  the  Council  has  neither the  experience  nor the critical  mass  of 
14 
I 
;  l 
: t I 
I ·: 
officials to lllldertake new tasks  in CFSP. 
Furthermore,  the  Commission  is  an  institution  which  provides  continuity  through 
changing presidencies and troikas. On the whole, the Presidency-Commission fonn of 
external  representation  (  eg  for  demarches)  is  more  coherent  than  1:he  somewhat 
unwieldy troika fonnula In the longer t~  under the impact of enlargement, there 
is a strong case for the Commission to act,  under a Council mandate,  in the whole 
range of external policies.  One  could  envisage  a senior Vice-President  for  foreign 
affairs (rather like Sir Leon Brittan's role on the trade side) who would speak for, and 
represent the Union in areas agreed upon by the Council. 
An alternative proposal which has been suggested would involve an independent CFSP 
Secretariat, roughly modelled on the NATO model,  and headed by an independent 
political personality. This would inevitably cre;tte confusion to the outside world and 
worsen rather than improve the prospects of achieveing coherence between the three 
pillars. 
Another proposal is for an elected Presidency. Instead of$e existing rotation system, 
the Union Presidency should be held  by one of the  Member  States elected by the 
others,  with  a term of office of at  least  one  year.  There  would  be  a loss  of the 
'socialisation  effecr,  but  such  a  system  would  increase  the  legitimacy  of the 
Presidency and reduce the costs of continual handovers between Presidencies, while 
preserving ample opportunity for a rotation of  the Presidency between member 
The solution to the question of external represntation is not a directoire nor a new 
lxxiy to oversee CFSP but rather a strengthening of the Community imtitutiom. 
It is worth adding that there is considerable potential for further rationalisation of  the 
Union's representation in third cotmtries. This is likely to be a particular concern of 
the  Union's  smaller  members,  many  of whom  lack  the  resources  to  maintain 
representation  world-wide. 
Finance 
In order to be effective, CFSP needs to be adequately resourced. Over the 15: two 
years,  diffiadties in mobilising the  necessary  resouras has  at times held up  the 
implementation of agreed joint actioos (e.g.  in Bosnia). In future ~  should be 
financed throogb the Unim's own budgetary procedure. Financing throogb the. Union 
budget is preferable to national contributioos for reasons of  equity, transparency and, 
not leaS, the need f<r timely respoose. 
In cmclusioo, these reforms \\Wid transform the effectiveness of  CFSP and baVe a, 
profoundly beneficial itqlact of  the EU's image in the outside world But if  the CFSP 
is to fulfil its stated ~  it will also need to address the thorny question- of a 
COIIDllOil  defence. 
15 5. 1be Defence Dimeffiion 
Given the economic weight of the EU, the world expects it to take on a greater role 
on world affairs. Whilst this will in large measure be done through the exercise of  soft 
power - economic,  fmancial  and  technical  assistance  - the  CFSP  will 'not remain 
credible  (and  the  EU' s  diplomacy  will  be  unnecessarily  weakened)  if it  is  not 
accompanied  by  the  ability  to  deploy  European  military  force,  tmder  European 
leadership,  in its support. 
This was clearly envisaged in Article J.4.1  of  the Maastricht Treaty, which states that 
the CFSP deals with: 
'all questions related to the security of the Union,  including the eventual framing of 
a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.' 
The vehicle for this effort is the WEU, already designated by the Maastrich Treaty as 
"an integral part of the development of the Union." Since  1991, some progress has 
been made in transforming this ambition into a reality. The prospects for co-operation 
with both NATO and the EU have been improved by the transfer of its headquarters 
to Brussels in January 1993. The WEU's capability has been increased by the creation 
of a Planning Cell of around 30 military officers, which became operational in April 
1993. NATO agreed in January 1994 to make available its own resources and facilities 
for  WEU  actions,  through  the  Combined  Joint  Task  Force  (CJTF)  concept,  and 
multinational forces - such as ARRC and the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force - can now 
also be placed at the disposal of the WEU. 
In addition, the WEU has created new categories of  membership in order to reflect the 
rapid change in the security environment of  the last few years, and in order to prepare 
for future enlargement in its own full membership. In addition to the ten full members, 
European NATO members who are not in the EU (Norway, Iceland and Turkey) are 
given  'associate  member'  status,  participating fully  in  political  consultation  at all 
levels, and having permanent access to the military planning cell and communications 
networks. Those EU states not in the WEU (Austria, Derunark, Finland, Ireland and 
Sweden)  have  'observer  status'.  Although  they  have  no  access  to  military 
arrangements, they nonnally attend council meetings and may be invited to working 
group meetings. Finally, since May 1994, the category of 'associate partner' has been 
created for nine countries of  Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, HWlgary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). These cotmtries 
can participate in certain CoWlcil meetings and sometimes in working groups, and they 
have some access to the militmy planning cell. 
Yet considerable problems remain to be  overcome before the WEU  is cap8ble of 
fulfilling  the  ambitious  objective  of a  common  defence  for  Europe.  Clearly  the 
foremost problem is the continuing lack of  political will. In addition, the 15 members 
of  the EU spent the equivalent of$177 billion on defence in 1993: less than the $297 
billion spent by the US,  but more than double Russia's $77 billion and around four 
times  Japan~s $40 billion Yet a large part of Europe's armed forces,  while still of 
value in the event of a major armed attack on NATO, remain ill-suited to new post 
Cold War roles such as peacekeeping and crisis management. Much of  the impressive 
total budget is used to duplicate the national capabilities of  fellow EU members, mther 
than  make  a  net  addition  to  the  EU' s  military  strength.  More  is  devoted  to 
maintaining small, and often uncornpetitive, national defence industries. 
16 
I As a result of these weaknesses,  the members of the WEU are unable to maximise 
their effective contribution to NATO. They remain dependent on US help, not only in 
the  unlikely  eventuality  of an  'Article  5' threat to  Western  Europe,  but also  - as 
events  in  former  Yugoslavia have shown  clearly - in all  but the smallest military 
operations. 
Yet  perhaps  the  most  pressing  question  in  the  security  field  is  the  possibility  of 
enlarging the full membership of  WEU and NATO, and how this should relate to the 
EU's own enlargement timetable.  Dtning  1995, the preparatory work is being done 
within  NATO  on  the  practicalities  of enlargement  eastwards.  By  1996,  therefore, 
NATO may well be in a position to take decisions on which membership applicants 
to  accept,  and  on  what  timescale.  It  is  vital  that  careful  attention  is  paid to  the 
interdependencies between this debate and the parallel discussions within the EU on 
its own enlargement. 
It  will  be  highly  desirable  to  minimise,  and  in the  long term end,  the differences 
between the composition of the different organisations - the EU, the WEU and the 
European pillar of  NATO  - that are each now separately responsible for aspects of 
Europe's security.  This will entail the medium/long term goal  of incorporating the 
WEU into the EU, either as a separate pillar or as an integral part of  CFSP. 
Convergence in membership between WEU and EU will reduce the current plethora 
of organisations,  each with a slightly different membership,  cmrently charged with 
European  security  policy.  In  establishing  a  coherent  position  on  a  given  issue, 
European countries now consult with fellow members of NATO, the WEU and the 
EU, with varying categories of  observers and associate members in each of  these three 
organisations, and with fellow members of  the UN and the OSCE. 
European interests are clearly not best served by this complex and opaque structme 
of interlocking, and often competing,  institutions.  As the difficulties experienced in 
relations  with the  former  Yugoslavia demonstrate,  this  complexity provides  ample 
scope for states to play off one institution against another, exploiting differences of 
emphasis in order to soften or prevent effective action. The obstacles to reducing the 
diversity of  European organisations are considerable, and will take time to overcome. 
At present there are five EU members not in the WEU - Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland and Sweden. With the IGC taking place less than two years after the accession 
of  Austria, Finland and Sweden, it will not be appropriate to insist on their immediate 
WEU  membership.  Rather  there  should  be  a continuing  campaign  of persuasion 
designed to bring all five  states eventually into WEU and NATO.  (Denmark_ is of 
oourse  already  in  NATO).  Such  a campaign  should  emphasise  the  anomaly  of 
countries playing a full part in the CFSP but not contributing to the common military 
effort designed to support it 
F.alatgement of WEU am NAID to CenCnd and FJBCem Europe 
The enlargement ofWEU and NATO to Central~  Eastern Europe is a key issue in 
the  European  Union's  own  enlargement  debate.  Whether  or  not formal  security 
guarantees exist, considerable de facto solidarity exists betWeen EU tnembels,  as is 
amply demonstrated by the various links betw~  all EU member states ·and the WEll. 
But this in tmn means that, in considering EU enlargement, members of  the EU must 
consider whether they are able to fulfil the requirementS of solidarity in the case of 
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new members. 
Because of  such considerations, it is highly desirable that the EU and NATO consult 
closely concerning their respective enlargements.  In principle,  countries could join 
WEU but not NATO. But given the fact that only NATO currently has the capability 
to fulfil Article V guarantees to WEU members, such a development would be fraught 
with  difficulties. 
In addition to the issues of the  'who' and  'when' of EUIWEU/NATO membership 
for Central and Eastern Europe, there are additional problems relating to (a) the natme 
of  the commitments that such membership would involve; (b) the concerns of  states -
most of all the Russian Federation- left out of  both the EU and NATO. 
It would be  'Wrong to  give Russia a veto on  WEU/NATO enlargement.  WEU and 
NATO membership should be available to all EU members who wish to join and are 
able to satisfy the requirements of membership. On the other hand, it is important to 
recognise the legitimate concern of  the Russian government that NATO enlargement 
should not  result  in a new  division of Europe  into  opposing blocks.  The existing 
members of WEU and NATO should be prepared to take concrete measures in order 
to make clear that this enlargement could not be cons1rued as an attempt to pose a 
new threat to Russia For example, it could be agreed that no nuclear weapons would 
be based in any of  the new NATO members. And, following the precedent set by East 
Germany's absorption into NATO, the Alliance would agree to include the forces of 
its new members in Central and Eastern Europe within its own collective ceiling for 
the purposes of  the CFE Treaty. The previous allocation of  these states would then be 
available for distribution amongst Russia and other former Soviet republics. In this 
context,  NATO  could agree  to meet  long-standing Russian demands  for  increased 
sublimits for  its  forces  on  its  southern  flank.  It could also  agree,  within the CFE 
framework,  to additional limits on the size of  forces that could be stationed in Central 
and  Eastern  Europe,  so  as  to  ensure  that  NATO  would  be  unable  to  concentrate 
substantial forces on Russia's borders. Adherence to these limits would, of  course, be 
dependent on Russia also abiding by the constraints of  the CFE Treaty. But it might 
find it to be in its own interest to support a revision of  the Treaty to take accolDl.t of 
its concerns. 
1be contribution of New 1\fembers to tbe Common Defence 
Yet enlargement cannot be a 'one way street', with existing members of WEU and 
NATO providing secmity  to  new  members  without expecting anything in return. 
Existing members have a right to expect that their prospective partners, as part of  their 
preparation  for  membership,  devote  the  resources  necessary  to make military  co-
operation possible. 
Although  this  is  an  issue  for  all  new members,  including  the  five  existing EU 
members  not  in  WEU,  it  is  a  particular  issue  for  those  states  whose- previous 
membership of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation has left them with equipment and 
procedures that are  generally  incompatible with those of the WEU and NA10. In 
order to  advance  their  cases  for  membership,  these  states  will  need  to invest  a 
considerable  proportion  of their  limited  defence  resources  into efforts  to shift to 
NATO/ WEU standards. 
It  would  he  unreasonable  to  expect  these  countries  to  raise  defence  budgets 
significantly while their economic recoveries remain fragile. Nor can prospective new 
18 members be expected to spend more on defence, proportional to their national income, 
than do existing WEU members. As their prosperity increases, however, it would be 
reasonable for them to  increase the size of their contribution to collective military 
efforts. Moreover, there is considerable scope within existing allocations for defence 
for a shift of  resources into capabilities that would more directly contribute .to common 
efforts. 
StrengtheniDg the WEU 
In  the  longer  tenn the  WEU  may  be  given  direct  responsibility  for  meeting the 
requirements  for  Article  V  defence.  In the  immediate  future,  however,  it should 
continue to delegate  this  task to  NATO.  The  focus  of WEU efforts  should  be to 
develop an effective capability to fulfi1  the mandate it was given in the June  1992 
Petersberg  declaration  to  undertake  crisis· management,  peace  enforcement  and 
hwnanitarian missions. The UK government, in its memorandwn of  March 1995, set 
out a nwnber of proposals  that are to be welcomed  in this  regard,  including the 
establishment of  a WEU Situation Centre and improving WEU intelligence handling 
capabilities.  In order for  the  WEU to  develop  an  adequate  capability to fulfil  its 
mandate, however, also requires progress on a number of  other fronts:  · 
First, pnor to enlargement, the WEU will need to address the potential for paralysis 
as  a  result  of existing  decision-making  rules  based  on  consensus.  It  would  be 
inappropriate to  adopt qualified majority  voting for  defence matters.  All  members 
should retain the right not to take part in operations which they do not approve - but 
some means has to be fowtd to prevent a single state using a veto to block action 
agreed by all other WEU members. 
Second, there is much that can be done to strengthen the operational role of  the WEU, 
building on the CJ1F concept agreed at NAill's 1994 Rome swnmit Practical steps 
can be taken to strengthen WEU - NATO links, for example by giving the WEU the 
right to nominate individuals for particular roles,  such as Deputy SACEUR.  Senior 
political roles within NA10 could also be appointed through WEU. And WEU could 
organise exercises using NA10 assets made available through CJ1F. These measures 
could be a modest step towards  institutionalising WEU's role as NA10's E\Jrope 
pillar, and thus provide an opportunity for France to become more directly involved 
in the integrated structw'e. 
One aspect of CJ1F  is  that it attempts to enhance the WEU's ability to undatake 
operations without US participation Yet, precisely because it leaves the WEU still 
dependent m NA10 assets for certain opemtions, it also implies a form ofl)S veto. 
'Ibere may however be some ciraJolstanca; in which 1he EU woold. want to. tQke 
military action without the need to seek US agreement f<r the use of  ~.set&·  uDtii · 
the EU hM this capability, even for quite modest operations, the a-edibilitY ·of the EU 
as an independent military actor nmst be seriously called into question.  ·  : 
Budgetary limitations. preclude .extensive· ·.duplication of  assets· already. ·puvided by 
NA'IO ; and the EU has no interest in seeking to repliatte the US's-:  .. ~e8  for 
largo-scale powa:- projection.  There is a strong case,  hovveV~,  .  for a· prograDime of 
targeted  investment,  organisat on a European  level,  to remedy  fhC·  most obvious 
deficiencies: for example in airlift, intelligence and connmmicatioos  .  . 
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In order to fund selective improvements of  this sort, Emopean defence must become 
more cost-effective. Fortunately, however, there is considerable potential for savings 
elsewhere in Emope defence budgets if governments are prepared to seriously address 
the enormous inefficiencies as a result of  the fragmentation of  defence provision into 
fifteen separate national forces. 
Enlargement could make this problem worse,  by adding even more complexity and 
duplication  to  what  purports  to  be  a  'European'  contribution  to  NATO.  Yet  the 
preponderance of  small states in the next batch of  members may also, to some extent, 
make it easier for states to take the difficult decisions necessary to move foiWard. For 
smaller states, both inside and outside the current WEU/NATO membership,  are the 
first to come up against the impossibility of maintaining a credible across-the-board 
military capability on a national level. 
As  a  result,  smaller states  have  been  prominent  in  recent  initiatives  to  integrate 
defence provision. Belgium and the Netherlands agreed in 1994 to merge their naval 
headquarters.  The three Baltic republics are fonning a joint peacekeeping battalion. 
The  Nordic  cotmtries  are  working  together  to  provide  a  joint  force  for  UN 
peacekeeping missions. 
The  larger  EU  member  states  have  also  been  active  in  the  development  of 
multinational  fonnations,  including  the  Eurocorps,  ACE  Rapid  Reaction  Corps 
(ARRC),  and others. 
How far an ad hoc  'bottom up'  approach will be adequate, however,  remains to be 
seen. There is a case for complementing this approach with a more radical 'top down' 
approach, in which the WEU would sponsor a series of  studies of  the practicalities of 
integration of  particular components of  defence provision, including details of  potential 
savings, implications for training,  infrastructure, equipment, etc.  First candidates for 
such studies,  which might  be conducted both ·on a WEU and a sub-regional  leve~ 
might include air defence, surface navies (learning from the Belgian/Dutch experience) 
and contributions to NATO and WEU grotmd forces. 
Procurement refonn 
Considerable potential for savings also exists in the procurement budgets for Europe's 
armed forces.  Where the US  has only one advanced fighter under development, the 
EU has three - Emofighter 2000, Rafale and Gripen - at a total cost (for development 
only) of  $24 billion. Despite large falls in procurement  budgets throughout the Union, 
a similar picture of  duplication is repeated in tanks, helicopters, submarines, missiles 
and  many  other  areas.  In contrast to the rapid  reorganisation of the US  defence 
industry, European defence companies have been relatively slow to consolidate and 
reorganise. Despite the growing costs involved, the protection of  'national champions' 
remains a high priority for many European defence ministries. 
If European  defence  industries  are  to  be  able  to  provide  the  equipment  'Which 
European  armed forces  need  at a price they  can afford,  the pace of change in the 
industry needs to accelerate. European governments need to accept that in the long nm 
the Europe defence industry can only compete with US producers, even within Emope 
itself: by reducing its stn"plus capacity, consolidating purchases on a European scale, 
and allowing genuine competition for defence orders on a Emope-wide basis. 
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:\  rnaJor  obstacle  to  progress  in  this  area  remains  in  the  torm  of the  marked 
differences in procurement philosophies within the EU,  with the largest customers -
Britain and France - occupying opposite ends  of the spectrum with regards to the 
extent to which non  mi~itary considerations should influence procurement decisions. 
One  school  believes  that,  as  in  the  case  of civil  markets,  the  Union .could  reap 
considerable benefits from liberalisation of  the market for detence goods just as it is 
already doing in civil goods. Another school contends that defence production has a 
special  'strategic' character which means that the distribution of defence production 
within the Union has to be determined, at least in large part, by a process of  conscious 
inter-governmental planning. 
There is consensus, however, that it is vital to take radical steps in order to improve 
the integnttion of Europe defence production. 
First, the IGC must look seriously at abolishing or reducing the scope of  Article 223 
of  the Treaty of  Rome, which is used to exempt defence production from competitive 
provisions.  There are some particularly sensitive goods and services which national 
governments will want to produce on a national basis, Wlless and until Europe has a 
genuinely  integrated  defence.  But  progress  in  'containing'  Article  223  can 
nevertheless  be  made  by  progressive  opening  of small  and  medium  defence 
procurement  contracts  to  European  competition.  A  1992  study  for  the  European 
Commission by Hartley and Fox suggests that the annual  savings from such a step 
might be between 6.5 billion and 9.3  billion ECU. 
Second, the Franco-Gennan proposal for a European arms procurement agency, which 
would eventually play a central role in co-ordinating European defence procurement, 
must  be  encouraged.  The  Agency  should  play  the  lead  role  in  managing  major 
multinational projects, such as Eurofighter 2000, Horizon frigate and a new European 
armoured car (presumably after its membership has expanded at least to include the 
other countries - Spain and Italy - involved in these programmes). In time, the Agency 
VJould become fully integrated into WEAG, the procurement arm of the WEU. 
If the Agency is to fulfil  its maximum potential, its members must also be prepared 
to allow the transfer of  significant research and development programmes to Agency 
control, with natjonal centres then acting as independent private contractors competing 
for  Agency  support.  It should  also  progressively  be  given  responsibility  for  the 
procurement of  equipment for integrated fonnations - such as Ewocorps and ARRC. 
Such a development will not be easy to accept, especially when the consequence of 
competitive procurement is the closure of  national capabilities previ~ly  protected by 
government  patronage.  Yet  Europe  can  no  longer  afford  the  fragmentation  of 
capability it now has. If  European armed forces are to obtain the equipment they need, 
and if  Europe  ~ to  retain  a viable  defence  industrial  base  in  the  face  of strong 
competition ftom the US, rapid moves towards a single defence market for Europe are 
an urgent necessity. 
Bunlelllbaring wi1bin tbe EU and WFlJ 
One of  the most important obstacles to the development of a common EU defence 
policy is the perception that some states wish to share in policyrnaking without sharing 
in the responsibility, and risks, involved in canying it out. In any field, the existence 
of  such perceptions can have a corrosive effect on the mornle and cohesiveness of  an 
organisation. In defence, where countries can be asked to put at risk the lives of  men 
21 and women,  it  is essential that such concerns are addressed.  If Europe is to develop 
confidence  in  a COtnrr'on  defence  policy,  and  with  time  a common  defence,  it  is 
essential that all states be seen to be pulling their weight. 
For  this  reason,  it  is  unlikely  that  European  defence  will  be  facilitated  by  the 
emergence of a 'core group' of states most ready and willing to undertake collective 
action. The organisation of  ad hoc 'coalitions of  the willing' in response to particular 
crises is also unlikely to contribute to the strengthening of CFSP.  Rather, there is a 
danger that such coalitions will be regarded as a reflection of the CFSP' s weakness, 
illustrating the very real risk that, with the Soviet threat gone, European defence will 
become increasingly 'renationalised' 
There may be some scope for the idea of  some form of military  'division of labour' 
between  WEU  member  states  on  functional  lines,  with  some  states  (for example) 
emphasising naval  contributions  and  others  ground  forces.  But  this  should not  be 
extended to a geographical division of labour, since, by appearing to endorse the idea 
of national 'spheres of influence', it would tend to undermine rather than strengthen 
a common  European  approach.  Some  countries  may  have  more  militmy  resources 
available  for  particular areas  by virtue of geography - for  example  Sweden in the 
Baltic or Italy  in the  Mediterranean.  But a primary purpose of a common defence 
policy is to ensure that members can rely on other members for support, wherever that 
support is needed 
If the  criterion of ability  to  pay  is  applied  to  existing WEU  members,  it can and 
should also be applied to prospective new members.  Some, such as Sweden, already 
make  a  defence  effort  that  is  roughly  comparable  with  existing  WEU  members, 
allowing for  size and wealth.  Yet others,  such as Austria,  do  not.  In making such 
cornp~sons, some allowance should be made - as it is the funding formulae for the 
EU' s general budget - for countries with low average GNP per head (including those 
in Central and Eastern Europe).  But such an allowance should over time be reduced 
as average GNP levels converge. 
All WEU members should be expected to contribute forces to operations authorised 
by  WEU.  It would be inefficient for every country to take part in every operation 
Over a period of time,  however,  national  contributions  overall  should be roughly 
proportional  to  national  capabilities.  The  WEU  Planning  Cell  might  consider 
monitoring progress in this regard for consideration by the WEU Council. 
The quality of contributions to collective efforts may be as important as the number 
of troops sent.  It will be vital, therefore, that new WEU members, within the limits 
of their  financial  constraints,  agree  clear  plans  with  NATO  and  WEU for  the 
improvement  of the  quality  of the  forces  that  they  plan  to  assign  to  these 
organisations. If  the forces of  Central and Eastern Europe are to be properly integrated 
into  WEU  and  NATO,  and  are  to  play  their  part  in  common  defence  effort, 
considerable investment will be needed 
22 6. Conclffiion 
To  meet the challenges of the next century,  the EU needs  a credible and effective 
CFSP. As the European Union expands, the need for an effective CFSP will increase 
further. A political and economic union of  more than 450 million people cannot escape 
taking greater responsibility in global affairs and both its citizens and its partners will 
expect an enlarged Union to exercise greater influence. 
Whilst  the  Union's  attention  is  likely  to  remain  focussed  on  its  immediate 
neighbourhood,  and  developing  stable  relations  with  its  most  important  partners 
(Russia, Ukraine, Turkey),  it will also have to redefme its relationship with the US. 
For forty years the EU has relied on the  US  to provide for  its security. In the post 
Cold War era, however, the Europeans will have to take on greater responsibility for 
their O'Wil security. 
The  CFSP  established  under  the  1EU in  1991  laid  the  foundations  for  a  more 
independent European policy. But progress to date has been disappointing and  much 
more needs to be done.  The IGC  in  1996 provides an opportunity to take the next 
steps forward, and this report has made a number of  suggestions for change. No single 
conference can hope to cover all the security issues that will confront the EU in the 
years  to  come.  The  I  GC  can,  however,  take  the  first  steps  towards  creating the 
structures that will be necessary to ensure that an enlarged Union is more, not less, 
secure than the present Union. 
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Atmex4 
l 
Reform of Distribution of  votes in the Onmcil 
Austria 
Population  Status qt!O  Pro~rtional system 
7,75  4  6 
Belgimn  9,9  5  7 
Deriinark  551  3  4 
Finland  3  4 
France  56,4  10  24 
Gennany  79,5  10  28 
Greece  10,1  5  7 
Ireland  34  3  3 
Italy  57,7  10  24 
LuXemburg  04  2  1 
The Netherlands  14,9  5  10' 
Portugal  1~3 
5  7  s  .  8  19 
s~  84  4  6 
United  Kingdom  57,4  10  24 
Switzerland  6,7  4  5 
Malta  0,4  2  1 
~ 
0,7  2  1 
42  3  4 
Polan  38,4  8  19 
Hun~  10,6  5  8 
Czec  qJublic  10,4  5  7 
Slovak Republic  5,3  3  4 
Slovenia  1,9  2  2 
Bul~a  8,8  4  6 
Romania  2~2  6  14 
Latvia  ,6  2  2 
Lithuania  3,8  3  3 
Estonia  1,6  2  2 
EU 15  365,5  87  174 
EU29  483,1  138  252 
In the above proposal, the weighting of votes is based on degressive proportionality. 
Accordingly, for up to 18 million population, member states would be given one vote 
per 1.5 million ; between 18 and 45 million, they would receive additionally one vote 
pee 3 million ; and beyond 45 million, they would receive additionally one vote per 
5~  . 
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